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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND JURY SIZE: Ballew v.
State of Georgia*
INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Claude Ballew, manager of the Paris Art Adult The-
atre in Atlanta, was brought to trial in the Criminal Court of
Fulton County after being charged in a two-count misdemeanor
accusation for distributing obscene materials. Ballew moved that
the court impanel a twelve-person jury after a jury of five persons
had been selected and sworn. The Georgia Constitution, however,
provided for misdemeanor cases in this criminal court' to be tried
before juries of five persons. Ballew contended that a jury of only
five was constitutionally inadequate to assess the contemporary
standards of the community, and that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments required a jury of at least six members in criminal
cases.' The motion was overruled, Ballew was convicted, and the
court imposed a sentence of one year and a $1000 fine on each
count. Ballew took an appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals and
there argued that the use of a five-member jury deprived him of
his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a trial by jury. His
contentions were rejected because a constitutional minimum
number of jurors had not been established by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari
and Ballew petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. There petitioner raised three issues, but since the Court
found that the five-member jury did not satisfy the jury trial
guarantee of the sixth amendment as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, it did not reach the other
issues.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TRIAL BY JURY AS IT EXISTS
TODAY
A. Constitutional Guarantee for Jury Trial
The right to trial by jury for criminal offenses is provided for
* This article was completed before the unanimity requirement for six person juries
was established in Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
" 'The proceedings [in the Criminal Court of Atlanta] after information or accusa-
tion, shall conform to the rules governing like proceedings in the Superior Courts, except
that the jury in said court, shall consist of five'. Ballew v. Georgia, 98 S. Ct. 1029,
1032 n.5 (1978).
1 The Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that a jury of six members
did not violate the constitutional guarantee to trial by jury, but made no determination
as to a jury of lesser number. Id. at 91 n.28.
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in the Constitution.3 Over the years the United States Supreme
Court has struggled with questions concerning the meaning of
certain phrases such as "all crimes" and "all criminal prosecu-
tions," the requirements of due process, the essential elements of
a jury trial, and the meaning of the term "jury." To further com-
plicate matters, passage of the fourteenth amendment guaran-
teed that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States would not be abridged by the states and that due process
of law would be extended to state actions.' This has generated
such questions as: What are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States and which requirements of due pro-
cess must the states provide?
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Constitutional Guarantee
Before discussing the Court's opinion in Ballew v. Georgia,5
it would be helpful to review the cases which have shaped "trial
by jury" as it exists or is interpreted today.
1. Serious or Non-Petty Crimes
In 1888, in Callan v. Wilson,' the Court held that except for
those petty offenses which according to the common law could be
proceeded against summarily, the guarantee of a jury trial in a
criminal prosecution conducted either in the name or under the
authority of the United States was secured to the defendant.
Eighty years later in Duncan v. Louisiana,7 the Court reaffirmed
the long-established view that there were certain petty offenses
which could be tried without a jury, citing several cases going
back to Callan.8 Thus, the words of the Constitution are not to
be taken literally; rather, the guarantee of a right to trial by jury
pertains only to "serious" or "non-petty" crimes. Duncan clari-
fied one question only to raise another: What determines whether
or not a crime is to be classified as petty or serious?
"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ... .
U.S. CONST. art. III. § 2, cl. 3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
' "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98 S. Ct. 1029 (1978).
£ 127 U.S. 540. 557 (1888).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 159 n.31.
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In Baldwin v. New York, 9 the Court examined the criteria to
be used in determining whether or not a crime is in fact "petty."
Ideally, a court should use "objective criteria" whenever possible
in order to indicate the seriousness with which society regards the
offense.'0 The criteria that have been set out by the Supreme
Court at various times are: the existing laws and practices in the
nation," the severity of the maximum authorized penalty," the
severity of the penalty actually imposed in the absence of an
authorized maximum,'3 and the nature of the offense.' 4 In the
federal court system, a petty offense is defined as a misdemeanor,
for which penalties do not exceed imprisonment for a period of
six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both.'5
2. Essential Elements of Trial by Jury
Until Williams v. Florida, 6 the essential elements of trial by
jury, at least for the federal system, were assumed to be: a jury
consisting of twelve members, neither more nor less; the presence
and supervision of a judge having the power to instruct the jury
as to the law and to advise them regarding the facts; and a unani-
mous verdict.'7 Prior to Williams, all of the cases which consid-
ered the problem stated that the right to trial by jury meant a
jury as it existed at common law and included all the essentials
as they were recognized when the Constitution was adopted.'8
Until Williams (and arguably even to this day),' 9 the right of trial
by jury guaranteed by the Constitution was interpreted to mean
for all non-petty ofenses trial by a jury as it existed at common
law when the Constitution was adopted. But this conclusion ap-
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
". Id. at 68.
391 U.S. at 161.
Ii Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
I Id. at 149.
14 District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976).
'D 399 U.S. 78 (1976).
" Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1930) (citing Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1899); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898); American
Pub. Co. v. Fisher. 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897)).
" E.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
" Justice Harlan. concurring in Williams, found that the necessary consequence of
the Court's decision was that 12-member juries were not "corntitutionally required in




plies only to the federal judicial system; what about the right to
trial by jury as it applies to the state courts?
3. Right to Trial by Jury in the State Courts
The right to trial by jury was not always extended to criminal
defendants in the state courts. 0 In Maxwell v. Dow,"' the Court
stated that the right to trial by jury in a state court for a state
offense was not included in the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States. In other words, the right to trial by
jury was not among the rights extended to defendants in state
courts by the fourteenth amendment.2 The Court went so far as
to say that trial by jury had never been affirmed to be a require-
ment of due process of law.
23
It was not until 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana,24 that the
Court recognized the right to trial by jury as one extended to the
citizens of the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
finding by the Court which allowed this turnabout was that trial
by jury was a fundamental right essential to a scheme of "ordered
liberty. ' 25 A look at history convinced the Court that although the
Framers of the Constitution did not intend for the sixth amend-
ment to bind the states to jury trial, the fourteenth amendment
was adopted specifically to put limitations on the states.
2
1
Duncan thus extended to criminal defendants in the state courts
the right to trial by jury for those crimes for which defendants
would be afforded a jury trial were they tried in a federal court.
After Duncan, a defendant accused of any serious crime was enti-
tled to a jury trial whether in state or federal court.
4. Essential Elements of Trial by Jury in the State Courts
Although Duncan established the right to jury trial in state
Trial by jury was not guaranteed in the state courts by the United States Constitu-
tion; however, the right was provided in many states by state constitutions.
21 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
2 Id. at 595.
22 Id. at 603.
2'4 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
23 "Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right
of jury trial in all criminal cases [covered by the Sixth Amendment]." Id. at 149.
2' For a discussion of the fourteenth amendment and incorporation, see Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949).
27 391 U.S. at 149.
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criminal prosecutions, the Court specifically indicated that there
was no reason to assume that the decision would impose the
federal requirements of unanimity and twelve members on the
states.28 Since only those aspects and provisions of the Bill of
Rights considered to be essential or fundamental rights are incor-
porated by the fourteenth amendment,2 only those elements of a
jury trial considered to be fundamental would be imposed.
This process of "selective incorporation" pervaded the trio of
cases which set the stage for Ballew v. Georgia.3 In Williams v.
Florida,3 it was held that a twelve-member panel is not a neces-
sary ingredient of trial by jury, 32 and in Johnson v. Louisiana
3
1
and Apodaca v. Oregon"4 the Court held that unanimous verdicts
were not required in noncapital trials in state courts. The Court
in its holdings on the essentials of trial by jury has progressed
from the historical meaning 3 of the term to a functional interpre-
tation of the jury's purpose. In Williams the Court maintained
that consideration must be given to the function that a particular
feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial .
3
The purpose of the jury trial as noted in Duncan and Williams is
to prevent oppression by the government.37 The right to be tried
by a jury of one's peers gives the accused a safeguard against the
"corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge. ' 38 The essential feature of a jury ac-
cording to the Williams Court is its interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group
of laymen.3' The number of jurors required is only that number
necessary to promote group deliberation, to insulate members
from outside influence and intimidation, and to provide a fair
chance of having a representative cross section of the com-
munity. 0
Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Morrison, supra note 26.
98 S. Ct. 1029 (1978).
" 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
3' Id. at 86.
406 U.S. 356 (1972).
34 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
1 For a discussion of the historical meaning of trial by jury, see Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 86-99 (1970).
Id. at 99-100.
= Id. at 100.
31 391 U.S. at 156.




Applying its new-found functional criteria to the number of
jurors required, the Court in Williams intuitively determined that
there was little reason to think that the purpose and function of
the jury would "in any meaningful sense" be less likely to be
achieved with a jury of six than with a jury of twelve.4
In analyzing whether or not a unanimous verdict was re-
quired to satisfy the purpose of a jury, the Court in Apodaca and
Johnson found that a nonunanimous verdict did not impair the
function of the jury. The dissenting opinion contended that a
minority view on the jury could be ignored unless the minority
was substantial enough to preclude the majority from obtaining
the necessary number of votes,"2 a result which essentially defeats
the effective representation of a cross section of the community.
Further, if a sufficient majority was obtained on the first ballot
not only would deliberation not be promoted, but deliberation
need not take place at all. To these objections the majority merely
said that no presumption could be made about the jurors and that
there was no reason to think that they would not take seriously
their reponsibility for the liberty of the defendant. Although the
majority's view on juror behavior may be correct more often than
not, a knowledge of human nature would indicate that there will
be exceptions to these responsible juries.
II. EFFECTS OF JURY SIZE ON THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
In Williams v. Florida the Court conjectured that there was
no discernible difference between the results obtained by the two
different sized juries based upon the few experiments that had
been conducted.'" However, the Court did not critically analyze
the "experiments" it relied upon. In Coigrove v. Battin," the
Court found "convincing empirical evidence" in four studies
which confirmed the conclusion in Williams.'4 But, again, the
studies relied upon did not really prove what the Court indicated
they did. As Richard Lempert suggests in his study of the Court's
failure to find any difference due to jury size, the majority in
those cases was looking for evidence which would support its
intuitive assumption that jury size had no relation to jury ver-
41 Id.
2 406 U.S. at 388-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
,3 399 U.S. at 101 n.48.
" 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
4I Id. at 159-60 n.15.
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dicts." The studies that have been published regarding the
Court's finding of "convincing empirical evidence" and "no dis-
cernible difference" in these two cases indicate that an elemen-
tary knowledge of statistics and behavioral science should point
out to those analyzing the problem that jury size does have an
appreciable effect on at least some of the Court's stated jury
functions. Some of these studies have pointed out problems which
exist when conducting research in this area; therefore, care must
be taken when interpreting or relying on any conclusions drawn
from such research.47 But the research, once analyzed for validity,
should be used when available. Sophisticated analysis is not re-
quired to show that the Court has allowed the right to trial by jury
to be fundamentally altered by its holdings beginning with
Williams. The right to trial by jury as it exists today differs in
both form and function from that which existed at common law
at the time the Constitution was adopted.
The amazing point about the Court's holding in Ballew v.
Georgia is that it cites numerous "scholarly works" on jury size,
48
most of which deal with the significant differences between six-
and twelve-member juries, yet the Court tries to use these studies
to conclude that the purpose and functioning of the jury in a
criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional de-
gree, by a reduction in size below six members. 9 At the same time
the Court reaffirmed the holding in Williams, a case which much
of this scholarly work tends to criticize. The fact that these stud-
ies show a difference in six- and twelve-member juries would
seem to indicate that the Court's decision in Williams was erro-
neous, since the rationale relied upon was that the two juries
would not function differently. But instead, the Court takes the
information and tries to use it to show that a further reduction
in jury size to five impairs the functioning of the jury to a consti-
tutional degree. Thus, what the Court is essentially doing in
Ballew is using studies and data comparing six- and twelve-
" Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 645, 649 n.9 (1975).
," See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 46 at 647-48; Zeisel, ... And Then There Were
None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 714 (1971); Zeisel &
Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
281 (974).
4 98 S. Ct. at 1034-35 n.10.
' Id. at 1034-38.
1979
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member juries and applying it to show that a five-member jury
is undesirable. This is analagous to performing a physics labora-
tory experiment with a twelve pound weight and a six pound
weight, then using the information gathered from their behavior
to determine the behavior of a five pound weight. It might be
possible to determine the direction of any change in performance
with relative certainty, but to be able to determine anything
about the magnitude of the change much more. information would
be required. Here the Court is doing essentially the same thing.
The Court has decided that a reduction in jury size from six to
five is of constitutional proportion based upon the evidence ob-
tained by comparing twelve- and six-person juries. Certainly one
would have to agree with the direction of the difference, but the
Court really needed more information before determining that
the magnitude of the change was of constitutional significance.
In fact, the opinion gave no indication as to the magnitude of the
change other than it brought the issue to that part of the "slip-
pery slope" which had become too steep." Admittedly there is a
relationship between the decrease in jury size from twelve to six
members and the decrease from six to five members, but without
information as to the magnitude of the change how could the
Court determine that it was of constitutional significance? To use
intuitive judgment when there is significant information avail-
able seems to be a naive approach to the problem.
If the essential elements of the jury function, as stated in
Williams," are analyzed with respect to the twelve- and six-
member juries, it can be seen that the Court did not apply its own
test properly; that in fact there is a discernible difference be-
tween these two juries. Further analysis can then be used to show
the change that could be expected by decreasing the jury size
from six to five.
A. Cross Section of the Community and Minority Representa-
tion Considerations
The most popularly analyzed aspect of jury size reduction
concerns minority representation on different sized juries. This
relates to the Court's requirement that the jury should be large
enough to provide for a fair representation of the community. The
1* Id. at 1038.
5, See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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degree to which minorities are included on juries determines in
part the degree to which community representation is being at-
tained.
The likelihood that a particular jury of a specified size will
contain a given number of minority members can be obtained by
the use of the binomial distribution." The only additional infor-
mation needed is the percent of the population from which the
jury will be drawn who exhibit the minority characteristic in
question. 3 Table I indicates the likelihood that any particular
jury will not contain any minority members for different sized
juries and different levels of minority representation in the com-
munity.
TABLE I
Percentage of individuals Jury Size
sharing characteristic
in the population Twelve Six Five
10 .282 .531 .590
20 .069 .262 .328
30 .014 .118 .168
40 .002 .047 .078
50 .000 .016 .031
The Court in Ballew shows the significant increase in the
likelihood that a minority would not be represented on a six-
member jury, but what it does not do is to show that the change
in the likelihood when going from a six-member to a five-member
jury is relatively insignificant. For the case where a minority
makes up 10% of the population, 28% of all twelve-member juries
would be expected not to have a minority member, whereas 53%
52 The binomial distribution assumes independent random sampling with replace-
ment. Since the population from which jurors are selected is so large in comparison to the
number of jurors selected for a particular jury, the fact that the replacement assumption
does not hold is not significant. The binomial distribution is given by the formula
n!
p(x=k)= - (p)k(l-p)n-k where p is the probability of a member of the popula-
k! (n-k)!
tion having a particular characteristic, 1-p is the probability of a member not having the
particular characteristic, n is the sample size (here the jury size), and k is the number of
individuals on a jury having the characteristic.
53 The percentage of the population which contains a given characteristic may not be
the same as the percentage on the jury list which contains the characteristic. In addition
to the difference between the population and the jury lists, any selection procedure which
does not provide for a random selection of jurors from the list would cause the statistical
prediction given by the binomial distribution to be incorrect. Challenges for cause and
preemptory challenges also prohibit the jury from being a true random sample. Lempert,
supra note 46, at 664-66.
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of all six-member juries would not be expected to contain any
minority members. This seems to indicate a rather significant
difference between the two juries. However, with a five-member
jury the likelihood only increases to 59%, not a significant in-
crease relative to the change from twelve- to six-member juries.
If the Court has held, and reaffirmed its conclusion, that there is
no discernible difference between twelve- and six-member juries,
can it now say that the difference between six- and five-member
juries is significant? This question is raised not to advocate a five-
member jury, but to point out the inconsistency in the Court's
logic. A move from six to five does not impair the functioning of
the jury as significantly as a move from twelve to six, which has
been held not to impair the functioning of the jury to a constitu-
tional degree. The move from twelve to six increased the likeli-
hood 88% of not having a minority member on the jury, whereas
the move from six to five would only increase this likelihood by
B. Reducing the Chance of Obtaining a Hung Jury
The likelihood of representation of minority members on a
jury can also be applied to analyzing the likelihood of obtaining
a hung jury in any particular case. A hung jury is favorable to the
defendant for several reasons and therefore any decrease in the
likelihood of a hung jury would be detrimental to the defen-
dant.15 It is well recognized that in order for one in the minority
to maintain his position it is generally necessary that he have at
least one other person supporting his position." Table II shows
the likelihood of obtaining juries with at least two members hav-
ing the minority point of view.
TABLE II
Percentage of individuals Jury Size
sharing characteristic
in the population Twelve Six Five
10 .341 .114 .081
20 .725 .345 .263
30 .915 .580 .472
40 .980 .767 .663
50 .997 .891 .813
P, - P1,
54 The percentage change may be calculated using the formula x 100, where
Pi2
P,, is the probability of a 12-member jury having no minority members.
Although a hung jury is not equivalent to an acquittal, there is always the chance
that the prosecution will not pursue the case, that the defendant will be more capable
knowing the prosecution's case, or in civil cases that the plaintiff will not have the re-
sources or inclination to pursue another trial.
" Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL. 371 (1963).
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The likelihood of obtaining at least two members with a mi-
nority viewpoint is not particularly favorable when the percen-
tage of individuals in the population sharing that viewpoint is
low, regardless of jury size. The problem is even worse than it first
appears because if Kalven and Zeisel are correct, even two jurors
holding a minority viewpoint will not be sufficient to hang a
jury.57 According to their study, in order to hang a jury there must
initially be a "massive minority" of four or five members.
8 The
problem with this observation when trying to apply it to smaller
sized juries is whether the "massive minority" must be in abso-
lute number or relative size. If the relative or proportional size of
the minority is what is important, a minority of two on a six-
person jury would be expected to result in a hung jury just as
often as a minority of four would result in a hung jury with a
twelve-member jury. Since the likelihood of obtaining two out of
six jurors with any minority viewpoint is higher than obtaining
four out of twelve59 it would be expected that six-person juries
would hang more often than twelve-person juries. 0 However, the
available data indicates that the number of hung juries is about
one-half for six-person juries as compared to twelve-person ju-
ries.6 If the absolute size of the minority were any larger than two
in a six-member jury it would cease to be the minority. So it
would seem that the absolute size of the minority plays some role
in the inability of a jury to come to a unanimous verdict, and that
two cannot perform the same function as four. The fact remains,
however, that there is virtually no chance of a hung jury when
11 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462 (1966).
Id.
As long as the minority viewpoint is held by less than 40% of the population. See
note 60 infra.
Percentage of individuals
in the population sharing 10 20 30 40 50
characteristic
Probability of obtaining
at least four out of .03 .21 .51 .77 .93
twelve jurors with the
characteristic
Probability of obtaining
at least two out of six .11 .35 .58 .77 .89
jurors with the characteristic
Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A. J. 367, 369 (1972).
1979
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there is only one juror with the minority viewpoint present, and
the likelihood of obtaining at least two with this viewpoint is
decreased with the size of the jury.6 2 The decrease in this likeli-
hood when decreasing jury size to five is, however, less than the
decrease obtained when decreasing from twelve to six. This again
illustrates the inconsistency of Williams and Ballew; in the for-
mer case the Court held what would appear to be a significant
decrease in the likelihood not to be of constitutional significance,
while the apparently small additional decrease in Ballew was
deemed constitutionally significant.
C. The Effects of Jury Size on Verdict Consistency
Anyone familiar with statistics knows that variability of a
sample increases with a decrease in the sample size. Because of
this, the relative consistency of verdicts for different sized juries
can be measured using the common statistic of dispersion, the
standard deviation. 6Nagel and Neef, using data from The Amer-
ican Jury,64 determined that the average juror had a propensity
to convict of .677, meaning that the average juror would vote to
convict the average defendant approximately 68% of the time.,5
With randomly selected twelve-member juries, one-half of the
juries would have average propensities to convict ranging from
58% to 78%.6 With a reduction in jury size to six, half of the juries
would have average propensities to convict lying in the range 53%
to 83%, and with a further reduction to five members the range
would be 51% to 85%.'" Again, as has been shown before, the move
from twelve to six has caused a greater change than the move
from six to five. The ten percentage point increase in variability
62 See Table II, supra.
The statistic when dealing with the standard deviation of sample means is called
the standard error. Here the standard error is the variability of the juries' average propen-
sity to convict. This average is obtained by a simple arithmetic average (mean) of the
individual jurors' propensities to convict on a given jury (the sample).
64 H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Frac-
tion Required to Convict. 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933, 952, 971.
6 Id. at 971-72.
a The standard deviation of the means of the samples (here the average propensity
to convict of a jury) is related to the standard deviation of the population by the formula
s = (-, where cy is the standard deviation of the population and n is the sample size (here
the jury size). o can be estimated from Kalven and Zeisel's data on 3,576 juries. By
changing the sample or jury size, n, the standard error for 12, 6, and 5-member juries can




caused by decreasing the jury from twelve to six members was
considered by Nagel and Neef to be significant in both real and
percentage terms. 8 The further reduction in size to five, however,
only adds four percentage points to the range. Whether or not this
is significant is not clear, but what is clear is that it is certainly
less significant than the increase allowed by decreasing jury size
from twelve to six.
Increased variability of juries not only affects the jury's aver-
age propensity to convict, but may also cause juries to reach
extreme solutions more often than a jury with less variability.
Since jury deliberation often acts as an averaging process, the
increased variability of that average for a smaller jury is likely to
cause smaller juries to more frequently reach extreme solutions.
In civil trials this would take the form of more extreme dollar
awards and in criminal trials it could affect compromises on of
what offense the defendant was convicted.
D. Likelihood of Conviction with Smaller Juries and Non-
Unanimous Verdicts
A jury comes to the conclusion it does because of the interac-
tion or combination of three variables: the case itself, the individ-
ual jurors and the preconceptions and characteristics they bring
with them to the trial, and the deliberation process." It would be
incorrect to come to any conclusion as to the effects of jury size
based upon its impact on only one of these variables. However, if
it could be shown that the other variables would move in the same
direction or not be affected by a change in jury size, then a valid
conclusion could be reached as to the direction and relative mag-
nitude of any effects. The case itself would not be expected to
change with a change in jury size,70 and a decrease in jury size
would be expected to have a detrimental effect on the delibera-
tion process.7 Therefore, if decreasing jury size could be shown
to have a detrimental effect on the defendant due to the individ-
ual jurors and their preconceptions and characteristics, then it
could be concluded that the overall effect would be detrimental.
" Nagel & Neef, supra note 65, at 971-72.
" Id.
70 There has been some conjecture however, that the increased variability of jury
verdicts as well as the changed probability of conviction with smaller juries does affect
the type of cases defense as well as prosecuting attorneys will bring to jury trial.
11 Thomas & Fink, supra note 56.
1979
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In order to compute the likelihood of conviction for an aver-
age defendant in an average case with a given community average
propensity to convict, the binomial distribution can again be
used. Table III gives the likelihood of conviction for unanimous
as well as nonunanimous verdict rules. As can be seen, the likeli-
hood of conviction increases as jury size decreases for unanimous
verdicts regardless of the community's propensity to convict. The
propensity to convict could be thought of as one of the preconcep-
tions a juror brings with him to the trial. It is therefore a distinct
disadvantage for the average defendant to have the jury size de-
creased. Admittedly, individual preconceptions (including the
propensity to convict) will not be the sole determinants of a ver-
dict, 2 but even if there were some mellowing of these characteris-
tics by the deliberation process, this input would still affect the
end result in the direction indicated. And if the deliberation pro-
cess is also detrimentally affected by the decrease in jury size,
then the effects will combine to decrease the defendant's rights
even further.
TABLE III
Average propensity to Vote required for conviction/Jury size
convict within the
community 12/12 11/12 10/12 9/12 6/6 5/5
.9 .28 .66 .89 .97 .53 .59
.8 .07 .27 .56 .79 .26 .33
.7 .01 .09 .25 .49 .12 .17
The most interesting point to be derived from this table,
however, is the likelihood of conviction for nonunanimous ver-
dicts. The Court in Apodaca and Johnson ruled that ten-out-of-
twelve and nine-out-of-twelve majority verdicts do not violate the
constitutional right to jury trial, yet a least in this repect, the
nonunanimous verdicts are more unfavorable to the defendant
than even a five-member jury with a unanimous verdict require-
ment. Again, consistency seems to be lacking.
E. The Balancing of Errors
Although the likelihood of convicting a guilty person is in-
creased as the size of the jury is decreased, so is the likelihood of
72 However, Kalven and Zeisel suggest that "with very few exceptions the first ballot
decides the outcome of the verdict . . . . [I]f this is true, ... the real decision is often
made before the deliberation begins." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 64, at 488.
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convicting an innocent person. In order to decrease the likelihood
of convicting an innocent defendant it would be necessary to
increase the jury size, thus increasing the likelihood that a guilty
defendant would go free. The goal is, therefore, to somehow bal-
ance these two conflicting types of error in order to reach an
optimal solution. 3 Traditionally these errors have not been con-
sidered to have equal weight. The commonly accepted view, and
the one accepted by the Court in Ballew, is that the error of
convicting an innocent defendant is ten times more significant
than the error of letting a guilty defendant go free.7" Given this
weighting and several other assumptions, Nagel and Neef con-
cluded that the optimal jury size is between six and seven mem-
bers.75 That is, the number of jurors is such that the weighted sum
of the two errors is minimized with that jury size. Changing the
weight attached to the errors, however, will have a significant
effect on the optimal jury size.76 It is interesting to note that a
weighting of thirteen to one is required to obtain an optimal jury
size of twelve.77 This relationship indicates one of three possibili-
ties: the jury system has been operating under a misconception
for centuries, Nagel and Neef's assumptions are incorrect, or this
is only one consideration that must go into the selection of an
optimal jury size. It is probable that all these and other possible
explanations are involved.
F. The Jury as a Reflection of Community Opinion
There is one additional sense in which the representativeness
7' An optimum solution differs from a maximum solution in that there is a constraint
or conflicting goal which must be considered.
1, 98 S. Ct. at 1036.
15 Nagel & Neef, supra note 65, at 946-48, 956, 975. The model developed by Nagel
and Neef conjectured that the probability of a 12-member jury convicting an innocent
defendant was .4 and the probability of convicting a guilty defendant was .7, and also
assumed that 950 out of 1000 defendants were guilty.
" Changing any of the parameters of the Nagel and Neef model will have an effect
on the optimal jury size determined. Thus, the Court's reliance on any conclusion as to
optimal jury size from this study is questionable at best. Nagel & Neef were not trying to
give an empirically determined optimal jury size, but rather they were trying to show that
a model could be built to shed some light on the question. The predictions of a model are
only as good as the assumptions upon which it is based.
71 By using Nagel and Neers information and changing the weights of the errors, the
following optimal jury sizes were determined:
Weight ratio 9:1 10:1 11:1 12:1 13:1
1979
Optimal jury size 4 6 8 10 12
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of different sized juries can be compared. If it is assumed that the
ultimate verdict of a given jury will be in the same direction as
that jury's initial majority vote,' Table IV gives the probability
of conviction for given divisions of community opinion. As a de-
termination of the correctness of a given verdict it could be
argued that the verdict that agrees with the opinion of the major-
ity of the community is in some sense the "right" verdict.7' From
the table it can be seen that in all cases where more than fifty
percent of the community is in favor of conviction the twelve-
member jury is more likely to convict than the six-person jury,
but the six-person jury is equally likely to convict as the five-
person jury. Where the majority of the community is in favor of
acquittal, the twelve-person jury is more likely to acquit, but




that would vote for
conviction 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Probability that at least
three out of five would
eventually vote for conviction .01 .06 .16 .32 .50 .68 .84 .94 .99
Probability that at least
four out of six would
eventually vote for conviction .01 .06 .16 .32 .50 .68 .84 .94 .99
Probability that at least
seven out of twelve would
eventually vote for conviction .00 .01 .08 .25 .50 .75 .92 .99 1.0
G. Behavioral Considerations
The Court's summary of the behavioral considerations of
jury size in Ballew seems to be a fair assessment of considered
opinion.8 ' However, this view must be taken for what it is worth.
, According to Kalven and Zeisel only one in ten juries will arrive at an ultimate
verdict contrary to the majority in the initial vote. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note
64, at 488. See note 72 supra.
7 Lempert, supra note 46, at 682.
This is due to the fact that a six-member jury may have tie votes initially whereas
a five-member jury cannot. Assuming the tie is broken with an even chance for conviction
causes the probabilities to be identical.
" See Thomas & Fink, supra note 56; Lempert, supra note 46, at 684.
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The research which has been conducted on small group perform-
ance is far removed from the jury setting, and although there is
general agreement on these propositions, there are conflicting
studies in some instances. There are probably other factors in-
volved in small group performance other than the number of
members in the group. Thus, seemingly conflicting results may
exist because the setting or circumstances of the experiments
differed, and these differences outweighed the effects of group
size. Whether or not the jury setting is one which would confirm
the results of small group experiments or contradict them is un-
known. In the area of behavioral considerations, therefore, no
statement as to the magnitude of the effects can be made, and
even a conclusion as to the direction of any size effects is less than
certain.
CONCLUSION
Although the preceding analysis has been concerned primar-
ily with the magnitude of differences between different sized ju-
ries, there is perhaps a more basic consideration which has to this
point been overlooked. Whether or not the magnitude of the dif-
ferences between twelve- and six-member juries or between six-
and five-member juries are significant may not be the relevant
question. The question may be whether any difference is too
much. The Constitution guarantees certain rights, and any dim-
inishing of those rights, however small, would seem to be a viola-
tion of those rights. To say that something only violates the Con-
stitution a little bit is not a relevant statement. Either the Consi-
tution has been violated or it has not; large or small, violations
are still violations.
Thus, when the Court in Williams conjectured that the
differences between six-and twelve-member juries were
"nondiscernible" and "negligible" based on a functional analysis,
it was saying not that the violation of the constitutional right was
small, but rather that it was nonexistent. In Ballew, however, the
Court could no longer conjecture that jury size had no affect on
performance, and correctly determined that a five-member jury
would impair the jury's functioning. But in light of all the avail-
able evidence how could the Court reaffirm its holding in
Williams? The only plausible answer is that the Court, although
recognizing that reduction in jury size was detrimental to a defen-
dant, found an interest of the state which justified the reduction.
The problem with this analysis, however, is that it would seem
1979
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to be impossible to weigh the costs and the benefits of a reduction
in jury size. Comparing dollar savings with the defendant's rights
goes against our sense of justice. The gains are relatively small
and the costs are speculative.
A quantitative analysis in law, as in any social science, is
imprecise. People do not behave in a readily predictable manner
as do inanimate objects. But this does not excuse the failure to
use those quantitative techniques available when approaching a
problem. Although the results may not be precise or certain, they
can often give valuable insight to the problem if properly used.
Here the Court seems to have failed to use the available tools.
The relative change between six- and five-member juries seems
so small compared to that in going from twelve- to six-member
juries that it seems incredible that the Court found the former to
be of constitutional significance whereas the latter was not. The
Court should have overturned Williams or affirmed Ballew; to
do neither was inconsistent with the evidence.
If the Court is going to use quantitative methods, and it
should where they are appropriate, they should be used consis-
tently and to their full capabilities. To quote H.G. Wells,
"Statistical thinking will one day be as necessary for efficient
citizenship as the ability to read and write." The day has arrived.
Dana Richard Katnik
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